Monetary policy instruments for developing countries by Caprio, Gerard & Honohan, Patrick
Policy, Research,  and External  Affairs
WORKING  PAPERS








Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.
and
Patrick  Honohan
Rapidly changing financial markets have led many industrial
and some developing countries to change to indirect methods of
monetary control.  More developing countries can be expected
to follow their lead.
The Policy,  Research,  and  Extemal  Affairs Complex  dstnbutes  PRE Working  Papers todisseminatethefindings  of woik in progs  an
to eneourage  the  exchange  of ideas  among  Bank  staff and  all others  interested in development  issues.  These  papen  carry  the  names  of
the authors,  reflect only their vicws. and  should  be  used  and  cited  accordingly. The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  ae the
















































































































dFinancial  Puliley  and Syr.!ems
WPS 528
This paper - a product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division, Country Economics Department  -
- is part of a largereffort in PRE to cxamine the effects of economic regulation  on the financial  sector. The
paper draws on discussions at a May 1990 seminar on monetary policy instruments sponsored by this
Division, with the assistance of the Intemational Monetary Fund. A volume of seminar proceedings will
be published in 1991.  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Wilai Pitayatonakam. room N9-003, extension 37666 (21 pages).
In the last few years, many industrial countries
have considerably changed their approach to  Shifting from direct ways of controlling
formulating monetary policy. These changes  monetary policy is by no means universally
have accompanied  - been a response to and a  appealing, they conclude. Direct controls are
catalyst for-  rapid changes in the sophistica-  simple to operate and seem to offer a sure handle
tion and depth of financial markets.  on overall credit or money growth.  Several
observers have noted that moving away from
In developing countries, both the evolution  direct controls oftcn involves a fundamental
of financial markets and growing disenchant-  reorientation of central bankers and government
ment with directed credit programs and bank-by-  officials, not only toward directed credit but
bank credit ceilings have increased the interest in  toward the financing of government debt.
at least examining and possibly moving to
indirect methods of implementing monetary  But monetary officials in some countries
policy.  have found that there is no foolproof way to
guarantee the achievement of any overall mon-
These developments have implications  etary target.  Bank-by-bank credit ceilings suffer
beyond their direct impact on the effectiveness  the same limitation: eventually nonbanks arise to
of macroeconomic stabilization and control of  escape credit limits, and banks have every
inflation.  They can strongly influence the  incentive to evade controls.  Moreover, such
efficiency and long-term development of the  ceilings limit competition and - by choking off
financial system and its contribution to economic  innovation and prompting excessive holdings of
growth.  liquidity - can curtail growth both in the
financial sector and in the rest of the economy.
Caprio and Honohan provide an overview of
the policy issues developing countries face in  Not all countries are now in a position to
light of industrial country experience in the last  apply the experience already gained by industrial
two decades. They discuss the objectives of  countries immediately in operating indirect
monetary policy and how these have evolved in  methods of monetary control, but mor-  (id  more
recent years, and they describe the different  monetary authorities can be expected to follow
policy instruments that have become available to  the lead taken especially by several Asian
monetary authorities and how these instruments  economies.
can be used to cope with the main shocks
affecting monetary policy - those related to
government deficit financing and to extemal
flows.
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INTRODUCTION
For a century or more it has been accepted that inappropriate decisions
as to the price and availability of credit, or as to the expansion of monetary
aggregates, could have damaging eff2cts on price and output stability in the
economy as a  whole.  Just how such  monetary policy  actions have  their effect and
what is  the best way to implement  policy  has, however, remained controversial.
In the last few years there have been considerable changes in the way in which
many industrial countries approach the  formulation of monetary policy.  The
changes have accompanied rapid development in the sophistication and depth of
financial markets and have been both a response to this development and a
catalyst for it.  In developing countries, both the evolution of  financial
markets and growing disenchantment  with directed credit  programs and with bank-
by-bank credit  ceilings have led  to increased  interest in  at least  examining  and
possibly moving to indirect  methods of implementing  monetary policy.
As a result of its increased involvement in financial sector development
iisues, especially  through  the  growing  number  of  structural  and  sectoral
adjustment loans  with a financial  component, the Bank has been asked to provide
assistance in  this area.  Given that the mechanisms  by which monetary policy is
implemented  can  have important  implications  for  the long  term  development  of the
financial sector (as  explained below), the Bank has responded  to these requests
in conjunction with the IMF, whose interest in assuring effective tools for
monetary policy is clear.
This paper provides an overview of the policy issues facing developing
countries in this area in the light  of industrial  country  experience during the
last couple of decades 1. The next section  discusses the objectives of monetary
policy and how  these have  evolved in recent years.  There follows  an account  of
lThe paper draws on discussions at a seminar organized by the Financial
Policy and Systems Division of the Country Economics Department of the World
Bank, with the assistance of the IMF, in May 1990.  A volume of the seminar
proceedingb will be published in 1991.2
the different poli  instruments available to the monetary authorities.  How
theme instruments  have  been  used to cope  with the  main shocks  affecting  monetary
policy - those related to government deficit financing  and to external flows -
ara  the subject  of the  penultimate  section. The  paper  ends  with some  concluding
remarks.
Th- Objectives of Monetary Policy
Some  basic  relationships  are  fairly  reliably  established  for  many countries
and can be taken as a basis for  obtaining a more complete understanding of how
the financial  sector works in a market-oriented economy.  Thus, rapid growth in
the money supply  over a protracted period will lead  to sustained inflation;  an
increase in the cost of credit or a reduction in its availability will dampen
down economic activity 2 and will  also tend to slow the underlying  rate of
inflation despite representing an additional cost to industry.
On the other hand there is not a clear one-for-one relationship between
monetary growth and inflation  in the short-run.  Domestic prices can be sticky;
exchange rates can overshoot their equilibrium levels following a disturbance,
and may  even  veer away  from equilibrium  for a while.  Innovations in the
financial sector may alter the equilibrium relation between money, prices and
output in ways that are hard to predict and may lead to an increase in the
volatility of this relationship (see  Goodhart (1989)  and Lindsey and Wallich).
Accelerating inflation  in  many industrial  countries  in  the 1960s  and 1970s
caused  authorities  to review  their approach  to  monetary  policy.  It  became  widely
believed that the  common  use of interest  rates as  operating  targets for  monetary
policy had contributed to inflation as political pressures had combined with
policy inertia  to slow  the response  of monetary  policy to rising  prices.  In  the
absence,  at least  from  the early  1970s,  of  fixed  exchange  rate  anchors,  excessive
2That is for an economy not experiencing financial repression.  If,  on the
other hand, interest rates have been repressed to artificially low rates, and
credit rationed arbitrarily, an increase in interest  rates may lead to greater
availability of credit and an improvement in long-term growth prospects.3
monetary expansion had  been tolerated.  In order to  correct thiu state of
atfairs,  several  industrial  countries  began  to rely  more heavily  on the quantity
of money an an indicator of monetary conditions, or even as an intermediate
target.  It was felt that the money supply would prove to be a good leading
indicator of inflationary conditions so that keeping it under control would
stabilize inflation.  The degree to which the money supply was targeted to the
exclusion of other factors varied from country to country.  In particular, a
degree  of interest  rate stability  was also maintained in most countries, though
for  some two-and-a-half  years (1979  to 1982)  the  US authorities  allowed interest
rates to move rather  widely in an attempt to keep on course for their monetary
targets.
Just  as  the  monetary  aggregates  became  more  closely  targeted, so  they  began
to perform less reliably as a predictor of inflationary conditions or of the
state  of aggregate  demand, as  noted by  Goodhart (1989)  and others.  In some  part
this contrary  behavior reflected liberalization  of financial  markets which had
been occurring around  the same time (Broaddus,  Judd, de  Vries).  To some extent
it also was due to the fact that near substitutes for the targeted aggregates
were utilized once the authorities attempted to exert contractionary pressure.
For  example, in  the  United States,  controls  on  M1 helped spur  the growth of  money
market funds  and led  to a  variety of transactions  services  for components  of the
broader money aggregates.
By the end  of the  1980s most  governments had  formally or  informally
abandoned the narrow focus on targeting  monetary aggregates in favor of a more
eclectic  approach  which allowed  them  to include  a  number  of different indicators
of the state of the economy an a guide to policy.  They had also instituted a
more flexible  regime  of  monetary instruments  allowing  them  to influence  monetary
conditions  more quickly than in the  past and  with a graduated pressure.  At the
same time many governments began to allow a much greater degree of competition
in the financial system; the use of more indirect means of monetary control in
this  more competitive  environment  helped  to  ensure that  monetary  policy  measures
were not as subject to evasion by disintermediation as they had become by the
1970s.4
An alternative approach ts the focus on monetary aggregates am the main
intermediate objective  of monetary policy has teen the use  of  ceilings on
aggregate cred!t expansion.  The ceilings were usually ensured by distributing
sub-ceilings  on a  bank-by-bank  basis.  This approach  was  widely used in  European
countries in the 1970s, and still forms the basis of monetary polLcy in many
developing countrieo  (especially in Africa, and especially those undergoing
policy adjustment programs supported by the 11F).  However, the definition of
the institutions to be  included in such credit ceilings gave  rise to many
opportunities for avoidance through disintermediation and the development of
near-bank and parallel credit markets which greatly reduced the effectiveness
of these  instruments.  Bank-by-bank ceilings also distorted  competition by
penalizing  more  dynamic  institutions,  and  discouraged  resource  mr  bilzation:  once
a  bank reaches its credit  ceiling, it  has no incentive  to compete for additional
resources,  regardless  of  the  profitability  of  its  clients'  investment
opportunities (Johnston  and Brekk, Cottarelli and Galli).  Various suggestions
have been made for attempting to restore competition  by permitting the trading
of  credit  quotas between  banks,  or by  establishing  an  au'omatic  link  between  each
bank's current deposit mobilization and the allocation to it of future credit
ceilings.  However  these theoretical  suggestions  have never  been systematically
applied, as many governments preferred to replace the bank-by-bank approach
altogether.
Directed  credit  programs  have  regularly  become  entangled  with  the
implementation of monetary policy.  In particular, a variety of developing
countries and several industrial countries have had monetary policy subverted
by  attempts to  exempt priority  sector credit  from overall  or bank-by-bank
ceilings. 3 Widespread  recognition  of the  drawbacks  of  directed  credit  schemes  has
led  to a decline in  their  popularity; once  willing  to reconsider  these programs,
31n France, a program dubbed the 'encadrement  du credit, entailed a  target
for the net asset growth of each financial institution, with penalties imposed
that were a (geometrically  rising) function of the extent of the transgression
(see  Mourgues and Joint Economic Committee).  However, until 1979, credit for
energy, exports,  and  social'  housing  were exempt.  As  expected, credit  to these
sectors  boomed and  led  to a loss  of  monetary  control. Coffee exporting  countries
in  Central  and West  Africa were  among  those who  experienced similar  difficulties
in the late 1980s.authorities have become more wiling  to examine monetary policy instruments au
well.
Countries that move  away from bank-by-bank credit ceilings to  a more
indirect means of monetary control may  find that they cannot achieve preset
objectives for  money or credit  aggregates  with the same degree  of accuracy,  The
classic example of this problem is the experience of the United Kingdom in the
1970. which  saiv  very considerable expansion in monetary  depth when  credit
ceilings  were removed.  Neither  credit  nor  money displayed  a stable relationship
with nominal  GNP or inflation  in  those  circumstances,  and a  single-minded  pursuit
of  a rigid  target for  the aggregates  would  have  been costly (see  Goodhart, 1989).
Developing countries  that move to indirect  monetary control, are also likely  to
experience  less  certainty  when  using  monetary  aggregates  as  intermediate
objectives.  It may be less difficult to achieve intermediate objectives which
are elements of the central bank balance sheet,  but the reliability of these as
a  means  of  influencing  aggregate  demand  or  inflation  remains  relatively
unexplored for developing countries.
instruaents  for Smootking  Bank  Liquidity
Banks settle their debts with one another and meet cash withdrawals by
drawing on their credit accounts at the central bank, or by using currency in
their vaults and tills.  It may be noted that these assets, representing bank
liquidity or the reserves of the banking system, are both liabilities of the
central bank. In case  of need, banks can also sell liquid  assets or borrow from
each other  or from  the central bank.  Over the longer  run, banks can repay their
short-term  borrowing through the proceeds of  maturing loans  to customers,  or by
mobilizing additional  deposits.  The speed and  ease with which such actions can
be  taken  depends  on  the  sophistication  of the banking system.
When  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  is  short  of  liquid  funds,  there  is  a
generalized upward pressure  on interest  rates and a tendency for bank credit to
be  expensive  and  scarce.  Such  pressures  can  be  eased  by  central  bank  action  to
provide  liquidity  to  the  system;  an  important  function  of  the  central  bank  is6
to ensure that seasonal  and  random influences  on liquidity  conditions are  offaset
so that they do not resoult  in corresponding variations in interest rates.  On
the other hand the central  bank can also take the initiative  to ease or tighten
liquidity  conditions  according  as it  perceives  a need  to stimulate  or  to  restrain
aggregate expenditure (see  Binhadi and Meek).
In  the  past,  many  central  banks  provided  semi-automatic  borrowing
f_cilities to banks at posted interest  rates (known  as the discount rate. Bank
rate  or  Lombard  rate)  which  were  varied infrequently  and  which  effectively  placed
a ceiling on short-term interest  rates.  Where banks were custumarily borrowers
from the central bank, its posted rate also provided a floor for short-term
interest  rates  as surplus  banks  could  lend  to deficit  banks at  or near the  posted
rate.  Because of  the political sensitivity  of this  key rate, upward adjustments
were often made too late and in steps that were too small.  As a result, most
industrial  country  central  banks  have  moved away  from  the automaticity  of lending
facilities, and now manage interest rates in a more flexible manner using a
variety of new instruments.  Each country has adapted its system of liquidity
control  in  accordance  with  local  conditions,  with  the  result  that a  great  variety
of  arrangements  are  in  use,  though  each  tends  to  satisfy  certain  key
requirements.  First,  there is no longer an automatic  availability of borrowing
from  the  central  bank  at  posted  rates;  accordingly  short-term  interest  rates  tend
to be more flexible than in the past.  Second,  most systems still have an upper
and lower buffer to prevent undue interest  rate gyrations in case the day-to-
day instruments for influencing interest rates are unable to cope with a big
surge in  the demand for  liquidity  or in  the availability  of liquid funds. Third,
the fluctuations  of interest rates  provide  much information  to the central bank
to help it gauge market conditions.4  Fourth, for open economles operating a
pegged  exchange  rate  system,  the  regime  often  provides  for  an  automatic
stabilizing  response of short-term interest  rates to foreign exchange flows.
Liquidity management in most industrial countries takes place today in a
4Note that  in order to  be  sure  of the  info-mation content of market
movements, the market must be fairly competitive.  If there are only a handful
of institutions in  the market, thsy could collude  to send  misleading signals  to
the monetary authorities.7
muc.i  more developed and competitive money market than was the case only a  few
ycaru ago.  While other policy  and technological  changes  have also played  a part
in developing money markets, it can be said that the more flexible techniques
of monetary management have required and encouraged these developments.  The
economy has been well-served  by a deeper  money market, allowing growing numbers
of corporate borrowers direct access to short-term funds without their having
to pay for bank intermediation costs, ant.  hae also ensured a more competitive
and probably less costly system of bank intermediation.  Firms allowed to hold
certificates of deposits or commercial paper bearing market rates of interest
will not settle for below-market rates  on their deposits.  Devcloping countries
can also benefit from such reforms (and some already are) as they too move
towards  refined techniques  of monetary  management.  In particular,  deeper money
markets  allow banks  to economize  on liquidity  holdings;  their absence  may partly
explain the predominance of assertions that banks in the poorest countries are
exceedingly liquid (Caprio  and Honohan).
The most  striking illustration of how apparently different regimes of
monetary control actually achieve the same result is the  fact that  in some
countries (for  example France and Canada) the central bank's posted (discount)
rate is normally kept well above market rates, whereas in others (for example
the United States, Japan and the Netherlands) it is normally below market rates
(Kneeshaw  and Van den Bergh). The resolution of this apparent paradox lies in
the  different  manner in  which lending  at the  discount  window is  practiced in  the
two groups of countries.  Where the disrount  rate is  below the market rate, its
availability  to borrowers is admlinisiatively restricted.  In these systems it
is normal on any given day to see some banks borrowing at this rate, but most
avoiding or limiting the need to borrow by holding a margin of excess reserves
even though  the opportunity  cost  of these  reserves,  represented  by the interbank
lending rate, is above the discount rate.  In this situation the discount rate
provides a firm lower bound to interest rates; it is also a somewhat flexible
upper buffer in that the banking system will be admitted to the central bank
discount window if the interbank rate moves too far above the discount rate.
In countries where the discount rate is kept well above market rates (clearly
indicating its penalty nature), it provides an upper bound to interest rates,
but is not heavily used by banks because of the availability of cheaper  marketalternatives. A  central  bank  operating  a  higher-than-market  discount  rats  policy
usaally has a way of stepping in quickly to provide a deposit facility (or  to
offer short-term bills on itself at a given yield) in order to place a  floor
below interest rates if they are quickly falling too far.  Thus when Germany
moved its  posted central bank lending  rate from just be.ow to well above  market
interest rates in  the mid-1980s, it  also began to conduct  the bulk of its  money
market interventions  through  mechanisms that did not involve  the posted lending
rates5.
Some industrial  countries  have nre achieved this degree  of flexibility in
their interest  rate  management.  For  eysmple  L'elgian  ban3s hold large  quantities
of government bills, whose yield represents thvt  cost of short-term funds in
Belgium and is essentially  determined  by the authorities'  funding  decisions. In
Sweden, the banks are subject to an automatic graduated scale of central bank
lending  rates  and a  central  bank deposit  facility. In  contrast,  the central  bank
lending rate in tho United Kingdom is used more as a fine-tuning  mechanism and
is managed on a day-to-day basis.
Between  the floor  and  ceiling  buffers  provided  in  the  manner  just  outlined,
the central bank usually has a variety of other instruments to influence bank
liquidity  conditions. dany  of  these  involve  quantity  rather  than  price (interest
rate)  decisions  by the authorities.  Thus, for  example, it is  normal for  central
banks to make projections  as  to  the  liquidity  needs  of  the  system  over  a  period
of  one  month  or  more  and  to  make  interventions  to  edd or  drain  the  amount  of
liquidity that  seems appropriate for that period  on  average.  Predictable
shorter-term fluctuations  can also be  met  in  a  similar  manner  with  instrumerts
of  the appropriate maturity.  It will be desirable to deal with unexpected
pressures  with  different  instruments  tailored  ,J  the  particular  circumuFances.
Use  of  one  instrument  rather  than  another  can  come  to  signal  the  authorities,
intentions,  so  that action taken to offset some expected fluctuation is not
misunderstood as a change of palicy, thereby avoiding unintended speculative
pressures in the market.
5In particular, it began to use what are known as 'reversed  transactions,
(explained  below) instead of lending.9
Among  the  instruments  used  are  reversed  transactions 6 in  domestic
securities and foreign  exchange,  transfers of government  deposi a,  and outright
purchases and sales of domestic securities and foreign exchange (Kneeshaw and
van der Bergh, and Muelendyke).  As regards the last category, outright open
market  operations  in  domestic  securities  are  most appropriate  to  meet trend  needs
for liquidity  changes; however  they are not used extensively outside the United
States, partly becauue most other countries do not have as rich a market of
first-rate short-term securities.  Lower quality securities are unlikely to be
useful as collateral because of their credit risk, while long term securities
are more exposed to  interest rate variations.  Indeed, this  is one of the
principal advantages of revLrsed operationst by buying a government security
and contracting to resell it at an agreed price the authorities retain the
initiative in terms of amount, maturity and t'ming regardless of the terms of
the underlying security. 7 Reversed operations can be implemented without much
effect on  the price of  the underlying security and they  have most  of the
charact'iristics  of the  secured loan  without  having  to  be  made at  the  posted rate.
The shortage  of first-class  collateral  in  developing  countries  has  made reversed
transactions  especially  useful;  although  the central  bank can  decide  to make any
asset  eligible for  repos on  a bilateral basis with  selected institutions,
acceptance by a wide range of market participants will be crucial to promote
tradeability.
For speedy action, central banks often turn to foreign exchange swaps,
6These are often known as "repos' or  'swaps".  A reversed t-ansaction
involves the sale of a security and an agreement to repurchase it later at a
fixed price.  It makes liquid funds available to the seller for the agreed
duration of the transaction.  The relation between the current price and the
agreed future price establishes an implicit interest rate for what, for many
purposes,  can be thought of as a secured loan.
7Thus  the  central  bank  can  do  a  one-day  or  one-week  repo  with  a  30-year  bond
as  an  underlying  security.  In  Tunisia,  the  government  has  in effect  securitized
part of the banks' loan portfolio by allowing some loans, presumably to high
quality risks, to serve  as the  underlying  basket  of  securit 1 fs  for  repos.  This
operation also  could be  viewed as a rediscounting  of a basket  of loans,  compared
with the usual rediscounti.tq  of specific,  or individual, loans.10
i.e., reversed transactions in foreign exchange markets (Kubarych).  The size
of the foreign exchange  *arket  also means that large volumes of liquidity can
be added or drained in this manner, and it is the main intervention technique
used by the Swiss authorities.  However this approach  is not  without drawbacks:
there are usually only a handful of large participants in the foreign exchange
market, so forax swaps are not good for providing or withdrawing liquidity on
a broad base from the  whole banking system.  Furthermore  provision of liquidity
through forex swaps (i.e.,  buying foreign  exchange spot with a contract to re-
sell it later) at a time of speculation against the domestic currency is very
risky  for  the  authorities as  they  cannot  be  sure  that  there  will  be  no
devaluation.  The authorities  in  several countries, industrial as  well  as
developing, have lost large gambles of this type.
Shifting  Government  deposits  between  commercial  banks  and  the  central  bank
is another tool by which the Authorities can influence liquidity conditions.
A rise  in  commercial  banks'  share  of  government  deposits  increases  bank liquidity
just as do expansionary  open market operations.  However, unless there are  only
a few banks  (as in Canada, where the  instrument has been most used  --  see
Shearer,  Chant,  and  Bond),  this  instrument  suffers  from  the  selectivity  mentioned
for forex swaps.  There can be technical difficulties as well: the procedure
needs to be governed by a framework  agrezment on the distribution among banks,
the  remuneration  of  the  deposits,  and  the  security  which  the  government  receives
for  its  deposits.  Shifting  government  deposits  neither  requires  nor  furthers
the  development  of  money  markets,  which  is  at  the  same  time  a  practical  advantage
and a reason  for not  relying on  them indefinitely. Nevertheless,  the management
of government deposits needs to be given attention in the context of monetary
management,  as the  distribution and  size of these  deposits will  influence
liquidity conditions whether or  not they are consciously being used  as an
instrument of policy.
Moving  from  a  system  of  monetary  management  where  the  central  bank  provides
liquidity  on a bilateral  bank-by-bank  basis, as  with  the discount  window, to one
where the focus is on managing the overall quantity of liquidity, requireo the
development of markets in which the banks and possibly other participants can
compete for their liquidity needs.  once again, there is no unique model for11
successful  development of such  markets; various institutional  arrangements are
possible.  However, participants in the wholesale market for -ery short-term
funds require trustworthy counterparties and an instrument, or collateral, of
the highest  quality.  For this reason several  countries conduct  their liquidity
management  in a restricted market  in which only selected institutions, for
example the banks, or approved money brokers, are admitted.
Although there is always the risk that, by restricting the  number of
participants,  the authorities  will r"t achieve  as competitive a market as might
otherwise emerge, a restricted market of this type can be a useful first step
towards the evolution of a wider money market.  In Thailand, for instance,  the
commercial banks make bids and offers for repurchase transactions in long-term
government  paper; the transactions are for a few pre-defined  maturities and the
central bank, acting as a broker and market-maker receives the bids, arranges
matches,  and  may intervene  on its  own account.  An alternative  approach in  which
the  central  bank also  deals  with a restricted  market is  the  Treasury  bill auction
in the Philippines, in which fewer than twenty (nonbank) authorized dealers
participate, but which provides the main instrument  of interest rate policy in
that country, as the authorities  decide how many of the bids to accept.
in some countries it is not possible to identify a sufficient number of
appropriately  creditworthy counterparties,  as where the banking system has  been
weakened by widespread loan-losses,  or where the financial sector is too small
or concentrated.  Elsewhere,  there  may  be a shortage  of good quality  collateral,
as where the government does not borrow domestically, or where there have been
problems of government domestic payments arrears.  In these cases action to
correct underlying  deficiencies, for example by  rehabilitating the  banking
system,  encouraging new  entrants, and clearing  up domestic payments arrears, is
desirable  anyway  and should  be tackled  before  attempting  market-oriented  reforms
which  cannot  be  supported  by  the  current  state  of  the  financial  system.  In
several  economies,  such  as  Indonesia  and  Taiwan,  the  central  bank  has  issued  its
own short-term paper to get around the problem of a deficiency of collateral;
this solution is being actively considered in Botswana.
One advantage to  using specialized  money market brokers or  market-makers,12
instead  of  banks, is  that they have  the incentive and  a clear  objective to widen
the number of counterparties  with whom they deal.  Even if it is possible for
these brokers to fund their lending from  banks, a wider clientele will tend to
lower  their funding costs  and also  allow  them more flexibility  in  managing their
portfolio by selling paper outright to nonbank clients.  In seeking out this
clientele,  they will broaden  the scope of  the money  market, provide better cash
management  opportunities  for  large  companies  and  other  wealth-holders  and  improve
the access of quality borrowers to short-term finance at the lowest possible
interest  rates.  As against  this it  may be  more efficient,  especially in smaller
countries,  for  the  central  bank  to  deal  directly  with  banks without  going  through
the additional intermediary  tier of brokers.  Many of the advantages of having
brokers may be lost if they are  wholly-owned and controlled by the banks.
If central  bank mianagement  of bank  liquidity is to  be  effective  in
influencing monetary conditions generally, it is essential that banks do meet
their cash obligations, including  the maintenance of any reserve requirements.
The  central  bank  must  automatically  penalize  unauthorized  overdrafts  arising  from
the clearing  of cheques  with sufficient  severity  to  make this quite exceptional.
However, it is not strictly necessary to have formal reserve requirements to
achieve monetary control, as demonstrated by their absence in Canada and the
United Kingdom, since banks will necessarily hold some reserves on a voluntary
basis to meet a bunching of withdrawals  or loan  requests from important  clients
(Caprio  and Honohan, Simpson, and Harrington).  Nonetheless, many countries  do
have  reserve requirements, and there  is the  view that  having  requirements
provides a fulcrum on which monetary policy can operate with a more reliably
predictable  impact on monetary aggregates (Lindsey  and  Wallich).  An additional
merit of reserve requirements is that they can be adjusted to produce desired
changes in liquidity: thus they can be raised in times of unexpectedly strong
capital inflows to effect a  broad-based mopping-up of excess bank liquidity,
thereby sterilizing  the dozwestic  impact of  the  inflows.  Apart  from such
occasional  circumstances,  howe.er  reserve  requirements are often considered  too
blunt an instrument to be used for varying liquidity conditions, since even
slight variations in them can produce large changes in the amount of deposits
consistent  with  reserves.  Furthermore,  as  money  markets  become  more
sophisticated, the  scope  for avoidance of  reserve requirements through the13
substitution of non-reservable instruments becomes very wide.  Indeed, this
motive was  also prominent in the rise in several countries of money market
accounts: these accounts  were popular because they evaded reserve requirements
and thus allowed the payment of higher interest rates.
Reserve requirements were originally introduced in many countries as a
prudential  measure to ensure that  banks would have sufficient liquidity  on hand
to meet unexpected deposit withdrawals.  For that reason they were expressed as
a fraction of deposits.  For monetary control purposes, there is no reason  why
they could not be expressed as a proportion of credit, especially if credit is
considered a more relevant intermediate  objective of monetary policy, and this
has been done in various countries.  It is also possible to have a progressive
schedule  of  reserve  requirements--  for  example,  through  marginal  reserve
requirements on extensions  of credit as  overall credit targets are approached -
- as a more  flexible alternative to bank-by-bank credit ceilings.  In most
countries,  with  reserve  requirements  based  on  deposits,  the  required  reserves
are  defined  by  reference  to  a  previous  level  of  deposits;  this  allows  easy
monitoring, though it  may  introduce  some  delay  in  the impact  of monetary  policy
on the aggregates.  This "lagged-reserve  accounting" also makes it easier for
banks --  especially  those  with  an  extensive  branch  network  or  a  cumbersome
reporting  system  --  to  know  on  a  timely  basis  their  required  level  of  reserves.
Whatever  the  base  or  purpose  of  reserve requirements, it  is  desirable  that  the
requirement  to  maintain  the reserves should  allow the flexibility  of permitting
averaging  over  the maintenance period in order to avoid unnecessary day-to-day
fluctuations  in  liquidity  conditions.  Countries  that  have  ignored  this  point
have experienced large swings in interest rates as banks have had to scramble
continually for reserves.
The assets eligible to satisfy reserve requirements are usually defined
to include  specified  classes of  deposit at  the central  bank and  possibly special
government bills.  Some countries also include vault cash.  Most countries do
not include instruments  which  bear a full  market rate  of interest,  and  therefore
the  requirement  represents  a  distorting  tax  on  financial  intermediat,6on.
Admittedly, the central bank does provide valuable services free of charge to
the  banking  system,  but  these  services  are  not  proportional  to  the  tax  base.14
When inflation and nominal market-clearing interest rates combine with high
reserve  requirements,  the  tax  can  be  very  severe.  Accordingly  it is  best  to limit
the  size  of  reserve  requirements  and  to  link  the  rate  of  remuneration  on  required
reserves to  the market rate  (even if  for  revenue  purposes  it  is  kept  some
distance  below  market).
Coping  with  Shocks
For the most  part, the  assets which make up bank  reserves  - usually
currency  and  deposits  at  the  central  bank  - are  liabilities  of  the  central  bank
(see  figure  1).  Non-bank  holdings  of  currency  are  a  relatively  predictable
quantity  (and,  except  in  centrally  planned  economies,  are  always  provided  fully
to meet  demand; control over the money supply does not mean  squeezing the
availability of hand-to-hand currency).  Therefore in order to influence the
quantity of bank liquidity,  the central bank must have regard to the remaining
elements of its  balance sheet,  adjustments  in  which usually reflect,  through the
balance  sheet  constraint,  a  simultaneous  adjustment  in  bank  liquidity.  The  main
other items  are  central  bank  lending  to  banks,  holdings  of  government  obligations
and foreign  exchange reserves.  (Thus,  for  example,  when & bank  purchases foreign
exchange  from  the  central  bank  for  a  customer,  the  central  bank's  foreign
exchange holdings fall, as does the bank's deposit at the central bank).  By
removing  the  banks'  automatic  access to borrowing from the central bank at or
below  market  rates,  it is possible to bring the first of these items under
control.  The other two items  may present  greater difficulties, and are treated
below in turn.
Figure 1:  Simplified  Central  Bank Balance  Sheet
ASSETS  LIABILITIES
Net  Foreign  Assets  Reserve  Money
Currency  issued
Domestic  Credit
Claims  on  government,  net  Bank  deposits
Claims  on  banks  Other  non-government  deposits*
Claims  on  nonfinancial  firms*  Capital,  reserves  etc.
*  If  any.15
The Impact of Government Deficit Financing
Some countries have established a firm separation of monetary and fiscal
policy in  that  they  prohibit any  lending  from  the  central  bank  to the  government.
Less rigorous rules in other countries establish quantitative limits on such
lending.  Where lack of fiscal restraint presents serious risks to monetary
stability, such rules can have merit, despite their arbitrary nature.  In most
countries, however, the central bank has to cope with providing an environment
in which the financing  of the government deficit is achieved while maintaining
as much monetary and general economic stability  as possible.
In Italy, enormous government deficits have been financed from domestic
savings,  while at the same  time inflation  has declined,  and the central  bank has
withdrawn from direct support of the government bond market. 8 This has been
achieved by maintaining a level of real  interest rates which, though high,
especially in recent years, can only be described as realistic in the context
of the large  deficits (see  Padoa-Schioppa).  The authorities have progressively
dismantled regulations which had been designed to provide captive markets for
government paper (such as obligatory minimum holdings by contractual savings
institutions  and controls  on holdings  of foreign  currency assets).  Now holders
of government  paper do so  voluntarily, and  they continue  to be  willing to absorb
more (whereas  those who were penalized by the regulations  of the past have been
slow to acquire voluntary holdings).  The withdrawal of the central bank has
reduced the rate of creation of bank liquidity and has slowed the growth in
nominal money, allowing the currency to retain its position in the European
Monetary System exchange rate arrangements and reducing the rate of domestic
price inflation.
8Although  the  overall  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  has  remained  above
10% of GDP since  the mid-1970s, in recent years the non-interest component has
declined to  2-3% of GDP.  Indeed, the pressure of a rising  interest bill,
associated with  the  need  to  finance government debt  at  market  rates, has
increased the pressure on the government to reduce the non-interest deficit.16
Where  the government  has not  been able  to  survive without  extensive
monetary financing it has proved impossible  to restrain inflation.  In Brazil,
the extremely high inflation of 1989 left the central bank no option but to
confine  its  objectives  to  maintaining  a  functioning  system  of  financial
intermediation,  again by  ensuring that interest  rates  were at  a realistic level.
Making ro attempt (at the level of monetary policy) to restrain the nominal
expansion  in  monetary  aggregates,  the  authorities  instead  focussed  on indicators
of inflationary  expectations including  the parallel  markets in foreign  exchange
and gold, and adjusted interest rates on a daily basis to achieve positive ex
ante real interest  rates.  This tactic allowed  the financial  sector to continue
to function for some time despite the difficulties of high and unpredictable
inflation (with monthly rates of inflation rising as high as 80 per cent or
more).
In Chile also - though inflation has been much lower in recent years -
monetary policy is  operated  through objectives  for  the real interest  rate.  This
interest  rate  is  transmitted  to  the  market  effectively  through  the  central  bank's
lending window and its deposit facility for banks.  The precise approach is
somewhat different, relying as it does on the daily monetary correction factor
(about  one-thirtieth of the previous month's calculated inflation rate) which
is commonly used as a basis for indexed contracts in Chile.  Indexation of
monetary instruments  remains  controversial,  however. Many feel  that,  by lowering
the  perceived  costs  of inflation,  indexation  reduces  the  willingness  of  political
authorities to take the necessary fiscal steps to halt it.  On the other hand,
the extension of  indexation to household mortgage debt  (which has not been
successfully implemented in all of the countries attempting it) can create an
important lobby against inflation.
External Flows and Monetary Policy
A freely  floating  exchange  rate  conceptually  means  that there  are no flows
into  or out of the central bank's foreign  exchange reserves.  In the polar came
of a rigidly fixed  exchange  rate, the central  bank has no freedom  to control its17
foreign  exchange  reserves,  as  it  has agreed  to  accept  or  provide foreign  currency
against  domestic funds on demand.  In between these two extremes are a variety
of different approaches to exchange rate management generating a variety of
implications for the operation of monetary policy (Argy).
If it has adopted a free float, a country cannot rely on exchange rate
policy to give it a stable price level.  Monetary policy, and in particular
limiting  the nominal  expansion  of bank liquidity,  will be the key to controlling
inflation.  It is in  these circumstances  that a stable interest  rate may be the
enemy  of price stability,  particularly  if inflationary  expectations  build  up and
result in more and more borrowing from  the central bank at the - now too low -
stable interest rate.
An active interest rate policy in a floating exchange rate regime has a
double effect on demand conditions in the economy.  By acting  to raise interest
rates,  the authorities increase  costs and lower  domestic demand directly,  while
the resultant capital inflows serve to appreciate the currency, thereby also
reducing external demand.  Thus the number of sectors exposed to the first-
round impact  of  monetary policy is increased,  and  the negative impact  on any  one
sector, such as housing, may be diminished.
A fixed  exchange rate, by contrast, should ensure a good degree of price
stability,  depending,  of course,  on  what currency  or basket  has been adopted for
the peg.  But the exchange rate is fixed only as long as the authorities have
sufficient  reserves  or  foreign  borrowing  capacity  to  defend  it.  An
inappropriately  high  level  of  domestic  liquidity  expansion (resulting  for  example
from the central bank financing  much of a high budget deficit), will result in
a steady drain of reserves, and eventually a forced abandonment of the peg,
perhaps precipitated  by a well-judged attack on the currency by speculators.
A fixed exchange rate can also be vulnerable even if monetary policy is
not  systematically misaligned as described in the previous paragraph.  For
example, spontaneous  short-term  capital  inflows,  if  not  sterilized  by offsetting
action by the central bank, may so far relax domestic credit conditions that
wages and costs generally get out of line,  weakening the competitive position18
of the economy  and resulting  in an unsustainable  drain  on reserves  over the
longer  run,  especially  if  the  capital  flows  are  reversed. 9 Prompt  action  by the
central  bank  to sterilize  some  of the inflow  may be necessary  to prevent  this
cycle,  which  has  been  observed  in  several  developing  countries  as  well  as in  the
smaller  developud  countries.  There  can  also  be  spontaneous  speculative  attacks
on a fixed  exchange  rate  (although  the  onus  must  be on  the  authorities  to prove
to their  own  satisfaction  that  the flows  are  spontaneous  and  do not  reflect  an
underlying  weakness  in the  economy). Few countries  have sufficient  resources
to  ride  out  such  unwarranted  speculative  attacks  without  adjusting  policy. The
normal  action  is  to allow  the  drain  of domestic  liquidity  which  such  an attack
produces  to raise interest  rates  - dramatically  if necessary.  This can  make
unsuccessful  speculation  so costly  that  the  attack  is  quickly  choked  off.
However,  the  impact  of  the  balance  of  payments  on  monetary  conditions  need
not  be destabilizing.  Indeed  it has  long  been  observed  that  a fixed  exchange
rate  country  whose  competitive  position  deteriorates  will  experience  a current
account  deficit  which, if not sterilized,  will tighten domestic  liquidity
conditions  enough  to lower  domestic  demand,  divert  the  production  effort  into
exports  and  improve  competitiveness.
Concluding  comments
Shifting  away from  direct  means  of controlling  monetary  policy  is by no
means  universal  in  its  appeal. Direct  controls  are  a  .ple  to operate,  and  seem
to  offer  a sure  handle  on  overall  credit  or money  growth. As noted  by several
observers,  moving away from direct controls  often involves  a  fundamental
reorientation  of central  bankers  and  government  officials,  not  only in regard
to directed  credit  but also concerning  the financing  of government  debt.
However,  monetary  officials  in  a  variety  of countries  have  found  that  there  is
no  fool-proof  method  to  guarantee  the  achievement  of  any  overall  monetary  target.
Bank-by-bank  credit ceilings  suffer from the same limitation;  eventually,
9Short-term  capital  inflows  can  be  spurred  by  a  variety  of  factors,  such  as
a rise  in  the  price  of a  natural  resource,  as in  the  case  in  oil  or natural  gas
exporting  countries,  or  reflecting  a  significant  liberalization  of  the  domestic
economy,  as in the  Southern  Cone  economies  in  the  1970s.19
nonbanks arise to escape credit limits,  and  banks have every incentive to evade
controls.  Moreover,  such  ceil'ngs  limit competition  and,  by  choking  off
innovation  and  prompting  excessive  holding.  of  liquidity,  can  curtail  growth  both
in the financial sector and in the rest of the economy as well.  Although not
all countries are now in a position  to immediately  apply the experience  already
gained  by industrial  countries  in  operating  indirect  methods  of  monetary  control,
it can be expected that more and more monetary authorities will soon begin to
follow the lead  taken especially in several Asian econonies.20
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